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Article 4

COMMENTS

A Public Trial
The right to a public trial by an accused is secured throughout the country
both by the Federal Constitution' and by most of the Constitutions of the various
States.' Even in the absence of such provisions in the State Constitutions the
accused could not be deprived of this fundamental right, for the United States
Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
guaranteeing a public trial is incorporated in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 There has been an abundance of material and a wealth
of cases dealing with the accused's right to a public trial and it is generally
conceded that the right belongs primarily to the accused and is for his protection.'
While the right to a public trial in criminal cases is well established, there is
disagreement as to the limitations of this right, that is, disagreement as to what
constitutes a public trial or the absence of one. Currently the question has been
raised whether the right is solely for the benefit of the accused, or is shared by
the public.5 The argument advanced by those who interpret the right to a public
trial literally is that, at common law, a criminal trial was public in its true sense
and everyone who could find room was admitted to the proceedings; and that
it is fair to assume that this is what the framers had in mind when the provision for a public trial was included in the various State and Federal Constitutions.
The history of a defendant's right to a public trial has been traced back to
the early beginning of the English Common Law. Although its exact origin
1 U. S. CONST., AMEND. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial ...... See Tanksley v. U. S., 145 F. 2d 58 (9th Cir.
1944); U. S. v. Kobli, 172 F. 2d 919 (3rd Cit. 1949).

2Ala. Const., Art. I, §6; Ariz. Const., Art. II, §24; Ark. Const., Art. II, §10; Cal.
Const., Art. I, §13; Colo. Const., Art. II, §16; Conn. Const., Art. I, §9; Del. Const.,
Art. 1, §7; Fla. Const., Declaration of Rights, §11; Ga. Const., Art. I, §1, par. V; Idaho
Const., Art. I, §13; IIl. Const., Art. II, §9; Ind. Const., Art. 1, §13; Iowa Const., Art. I,
§10; Kan. Const., Bill of Rights, §10; Ky. Const., §11; La. Const., Art. I, §9; Me. Const.,
Art. I, §6; Mich. Const., Art. II, §19; Minn. Const., Art. 1, §6; Miss. Const., Art. 3,

§26; Mo. Const., Art. I, §18; Mont. Const., Art. III, §16; Neb. Const., Art. I, §11;
N. J. Const., Art. 1, §8; N. M. Const., Art. II, §14; N. C. Const., Art. I, §13 ("open
court"); N. D. Const., Art. I, §13; Ohio Const., Art. I, §10; Okla. Const., Art. II, §20;
Ore. Const., Art. I, §11; Pa. Const., Art. I, §9; R. I. Const., Art. I, §10; S. C. Const.,
Art. I, §18; S. D. Const., Art. 6, §7; Tenn. Const., Art. I, §9; Texas Const., Art. I, §10;
Utah Const., Art. I, §12; Vt. Const., ch. I, Art. 10th; Wash. Const., Art. I, §22; W. Va.
Const., Art. III, §14; Wis. Const., Art. I, §7.
48In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948).
See 156 A. L. R. 257; Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381
(1932); 49 Col. L. Rev. 110 (1949); 35 Cornell L. Q. 395 (1949-50); 25 Temp. L. Q. 91
(1951-52); 28 Texas L. Rev. 265 (1949-50); and, CROss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
(1953).
5 United Press Assn's v. Valente, 281 App. Div. 395, 120 N. Y. S. 395 (1953).
Also see: People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153 (1894); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont.

205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1916); State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N. E. 462 (1906);
State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 Pac. 480 (1928).

is not known, the right has always been closely allied with the right to a jury
trial.' The reasons given for the requirement that a trial be public are that
"Star Chamber" proceedings are eliminated, and that "the knowledge that every
criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion
is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power."7 Professor Wigmore
states that a public trial is desirable because: (1) publicity makes for trustworthiness and completeness of testimony, (2) a wholesome effect is produced
upon all the officers of the court, (3) a public trial informs those who are likely
to be affected by the proceedings, and (4) a public trial has an educative effect
upon the public in that respect for the law is increased and confidence is secured
8
in judicial remedies.
The requisite that a trial be public has been held by some courts to mean
that the public or part of the public cannot be excluded from the courtroom.9
Other cases have held that a public trial does not mean that every person who
wishes must be admitted to the courtroom. 10 The basis for exclusion of the public
by the courts that interpret the right broadly rests upon the fact that the requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused and that the public
merely has the privilege to attend." The demand for a public trial in these
jurisdictions is fulfilled merely if a reasonable proportion of the public is allowed
to attend and the remainder of the public may be excluded without impairing the
accused's right. 12 The requirement of a public trial was fulfilled at common law
even though those persons were excluded who were attracted by curiosity.18
It is held in almost all jurisdictions that the public may be excluded when administration of justice is interfered with,"1 or because of limitations of space,' 5
or because of the conduct of the spectators. 6 There is also substantial agreement
that the public may be excluded when their presence may embarrass a young girl
who may be called as a witness in cases involving rape or scandalous and indecent
17
matter.
When we move over into the area where the character of the evidence determines the admission or exclusion of the public from the courtroom, it is difficult
6 See CROSS,

THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953),

p. 155; Radin,

The Right

to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381 (1932). Also see In re Oliver, supra note 5, for a
short history of the right to a public trial.
7 In re Oliver, supra note 5, at 270.
8 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1834 (3rd ed. 1940).
9 14 Am. Jur. §141, n. 12.
1od. n. 11.
11 See Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp. L. Q. 381 (1932).
1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903), p. 441.
Is 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1835 (3rd ed. 1940).
1Davis v. Smith, 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917); Makley v. State, 490 Ohio App.
359, 197 N. E. 339 (1934).
l' Wendling v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S. W. 205 (1911); Kugadt v.
State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 691, 44 S. W. 989 (1898); Commonwealth v. Trinkle, 297
Pa. 564, 124 Atl. 191 (1924).
16 Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242,
37 Pac. 153 (1894).
1'See 4 Stanford Law Review 101 (1951-52).

to state a general rule for it is here that the cases are in greatest conflict. While
a number of cases have raised the question whether the courts have the power, in
the absence of a statute, to exclude everyone from the courtroom because of the
character of the evidence, nevertheless, much depends upon the interpretation of
the word "public" and who is excluded.18 Some courts have held that a trial is
public even though only the relatives of the accused are present, while other
courts have held to the contrary if members of the press were not included in
"
the small coterie of spectators permitted to attend.
Jurisdictions that hold the exclusion of the public is dependent upon the
nature of the evidence can be divided into two groups. A majority of jurisdictions, supported by statutes, state that the courts can exclude the greater portion
of the audience because of the character of the evidence, but only as long as
20
A limited
no actual prejudice results to the defendant from the exclusion.
number of jurisdictions, on the other hand, hold that a trial must be public in
a literal sense regardless of the character of the evidence.
The majority of jurisdictions interpret the guarantee of a public trial broadly
and hold that a trial is public as long as it is not secret.21 Thus, as long as there
is a special or limited group of spectators in attendance at a trial, such as,
members of the bar, newspapermen, or friends and relatives of the accused, the
22
In
right to a public trial is met, even though the general public is excluded.
these jurisdictions the accused must show actual prejudice as a result of the
exclusion of the general public before the court will consider whether there has
been a violation of the constitutional right. 23 These courts that regard this
right with less vigor hold that failure to interpose an objection to the exclusion
of the public constitutes a waiver of the right. 24
A minority of jurisdictions, namely, those that adhere to the literal view of
a public trial and insist that a trial be truly public, hold that the right to
a public trial is not waived by the defendant by mere failure to object to the
exclusion of spectators. 21 Cases have been overturned in these jurisdictions even
when attendance at a trial was limited to a group of a special class. Thus,
in cases where attendance at a "public trial" was limited to only those "having
18 156 A. L. R. 257, 276 (1945).
19 Davis v. U. S., 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917).

But see: Commonwealth v. Blondin,

324 Mass. 564, 87 N. E. 2d 455 (1949); State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142, 217 Pac. 705
(1923).
20
See 28 Texas L. Rev. 265 (1949-50).
21Reagan v. U. S., 202 Fed. 488

(9th Cir. 1913); Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz.

457, 172 Pac. 273 (1918); People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N. Y. S. 433 (1914).
22 Reagan v. U. S., 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 36, 2 S. W. 631 (1886); State v. Nyphus, 19 N. D. 326, 124 N. W. 71 (1909).
23 Reagan v. U. S., 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913); Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126,
46 Pac. 637 (1896); State v. Nyphus, 19 N. D. 326, 124 N. W. 71 (1909).

24 People v. Swafford, 65 Cal. 223, 3 Pac. 809 (1889); Benedict v. People, 23 Colo.
126, 46 Pac. 637 (1896).
25 Stewart v. State, 18 Ala. App. 662, 93 So. 274 (1922); State v. Marsh, 126 Wash.
142, 217 Pac. 705 (1923).

an interest in the case, ' 26 members of the press, 27 or relatives or designated
friends of the defendant, 28 the courts have held that the publicity of the proceeding was not sufficient.
The case of United States v. Kolbi 26 is a good example of the second group
of cases, that is, cases that interpret literally the constitutional guarantee of
a public trial. In the Kolbi case the defendant was on trial for conspiring to
violate the Mann Act. The Judge ordered the exclusion of all persons (including
many young girls) from the courtroom, except those having an interest in the
case and except the press, because of the character of the evidence to be presented.
The defendant was subsequently found guilty as charged. On appeal the Court held
that attendance only of the newspapermen, aside from those having an interest
in the case, was not sufficient to meet the requirement for a public trial. The
Court also held that it is reversible error without a showing of prejudice to exclude the public from the courtroom.80
Some courts in these jurisdictions have placed such a high value on the
constitutional guarantee of a public trial that they consider the right also to
be shared by the public." These courts that regard the right so highly almost
unanimously hold that the public's right is co-existent 2 with the right of the
accused, and that the right must be accorded a construction not inconsistent with
the rule laid down in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. 83 The contention in
these cases is that unless the public is admitted to the courtroom, the public
cannot see that the accused is fairly dealt with.
In the case of State v. Keeler34 the court stated that, while the purpose of
the right was primarily for the accused, it likewise involves questions of public
interest and concern. The court went on to say that "the people are interested
in knowing and have the right to know how their servants-the judge, county
People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 190 P. 2d 290 (1948).
State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1918); State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio
St. 255, 79 N. E. 462 (1906).
28 Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228,
71 N. W. 491 (1897).
29 172 F. 2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1949); see 35 Cornell L. Q. 395 (1949-50).
30 Tanksley v. U. S., 145 F. 2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944). See Davis v. U. S.,247 Fed.
394 (8th Cir. 1917); Wade v. State, 207 Ala. 1, 92 So. 101 (1921); People v. Byrnes,
84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 190 P. 2d (1948); People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N. W.
491 (1897); State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St. 255, 79 N. E. 462 (1906); 156 A. L. R. 257.
s'People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153 (1894); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont.
205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1916); State v. Copp, 15 N. H. 212 (1844); State v. Hensley, 75
Ohio St. 255, 79 N. E. 462 (1906); State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 Pac. 480 (1928).
2State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 Pac. 480 (1928), "anything short of such requirements cannot well be said to be a public trial."
33 "The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public
may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the
importance of their functions; and the requirement is fairly observed if, without partiality
or favoritism, a reasonable proportion of the public is suffered to attend, notwithstanding
that those persons whose presence could be of no service to the accused, and who would
only be drawn thither by a prurient curiosity, are excluded altogether." COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 441 (7th ed. 1903).
26
27

8452

Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1916).

attorney, sheriff, and clerk--conduct the public's business."
In People v. Hartman5 itwas stated that the trial should be "public" in
the ordinary sense of the term and that "the doors of the courtroom are expected
to be kept open, the public entitled to be admitted."
In a suit by an ejected spectator against the judge who ordered his removal,
it was held that, even though the evidence might have been salacious, spectators
could not be arbitrarily ejected from the courtroom.36 It was pointed out that
87
the right to have the courts open is the right of the public.
In State v. Hensley 8 the court stated that the term "public", in its enlarged
sense, takes in the entire community and does not limit or restrict attendance to
any particular class but that the courtroom is open to the free observation of all.
Similarly, in the case of Davis v. United States 9 the court stated that a public
trial is a trial at which the public is free to attend. The court went on
to say: "It is not essential to the right of attendance that a person be a relative
of the accused, an attorney, a witness, or a reporter for the press, nor can those
classes be taken as the exclusive representatives of the public."
As a result of this view, that is, that the public also has an interest in a
public trial, the members of the press, as representatives of all the people, challenge any exclusion of the public from the courtroom. There are, however,
relatively few instances where the press has been excluded. Even in jurisdictions
that maintain the right to a public trial is solely for the accused, provisions are
usually made to allow the members of the press to remain after all other spectators
have been excluded. In these jurisdictions, the courts have justified the attendance of the press on the grounds that as representatives of the public they "have
40
an interest in the case" and have a legitimate reason for being present.
The most recent State Court decision involving "public trials" and the right
of the public to attend, in particular, the right of the press as representatives
of the public to attend, was the case of United Press Assn's v. Valente.4" The
case involved pandering and everyone (including the press) was excluded from
the courtroom except such persons as the defendant deemed necessary for his comfort and protection, including friends and relatives. The newspaper publishers
challenged the trial judge's order alleging that this was a violation of the guarantee of public trial in criminal actions and that the press, as members of the public,
had a right to attend the trial.
35 103 Cal. 242, 245, 37 Pac. 153, 154 (1894).
86 86 Me. 80, 29 At. 943 (1893). The action was one of trespass against the trial
Judge for ordering plaintiff's forcible removal after he ignored the Judge's order excluding
all the spectators from the courtroom. After upholding the spectator's right to be present
the court held that the defendant Judge acted from honest motive and cannot be held liable
while87acting within his jurisdiction.
State v. Copp, 15 N. H. 212 (1844).
8875 Ohio St. 255, 79 N. E.462 (1906).
89 247 Fed. 394 (8th Cir. 1917).
40 See Commonwealth v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N. E. 2d 455 (1949); State v.
Marsh, 126 Wash. 142, 217 Pac. 705 (1923).
41281 App.Div. 395, 120 N. Y. S.395 (1953).

The Supreme Court of New York held that although every citizen could
freely attend the sittings of every court, nevertheless, the public is not endowed
with an independent right and could not assert the accused's right to a public trial
for him. A statute gave the judge permission to exclude the public (press included) at his descretion in certain types of trials. The court went on to say that
the contention of the press that they had a right to attend the proceedings was
closely interwoven with the defendant's right to a public trial. The right, however, belonged solely to the accused and he alone could assert the right.
Thus, the New York case was the first decision on the precise question of
the right of the public in a public trial. Any right that the public may have
does not come from the constitutional provision that criminal trials must be public.
Prior cases grouped New York with those jurisdictions that adopted the broader
view of public trials, namely, that the public may be excluded, with or without
a statute, when in the discretion of the judge the character of the evidence
warrants such an exclusion. The decision of the case of United Press Assn's v.
Valente42 was consistent with the earlier New York cases and merely a logical
4
extension of the earlier decisions. 8
Even though the guarantee to a public trial is couched in general terms in
the various State and Federal Constitutions, it is fair to assume that the framers
included the provision for a public trial for the benefit of the accused without
any thought of the public sharing this right. While it may be true that at common
law a trial was public in a literal sense, nevertheless, the right is not an absolute
one. Discretion should be vested in the trial judge to limit attendance in certain
types of cases when the ends of justice warrant such exclusion. Undoubtedly
specific instances can be conjured when restricted attendance could lead to inequities. It is to be noted, however, that no jurisdiction excludes everyone from
the courtroom, but, at most, the courts bar only the general public and allow
some "spectators" to remain in attendance. A majority of the States have avoided
the problem of public trials by taking the middle ground and have enacted
statutes permitting a judge, in his discretion, to restrict admission in certain types
of cases. Thus, by limiting the exercise of the judges' discretion to merely those
cases in which the character of the evidence is salacious, the objection to the
exclusion of the general public is even less valid. The objection to restricting
admission to the courtroom to a special group on the grounds that such a group
is not truly representative of the public is without merit. The fact that a special
group is permitted to attend a criminal trial should more than satisfy the
requirement of publicity for there is no necessity that those in attendance be a
true cross-section of the public.
While a limited number of jurisdictions require unrestricted attendance at
public trials, an overwhelming number of jurisdictions limit attendance at public
42Ibid.
43
People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N. Y. S. 433 (1914); People v. Miller,
257 N. Y. 54, 177 N. E. 306 (1931).

trials by statute or vest the trial judge with discretion to exclude the public from
the courtroom. It cannot be denied that the public has an interest in public trials,
however, the public right in a public trial is not derived from the constitutional
guarantee of a public trial, but rather is an independent right bestowed on the
public so that they may see and know how justice is administered. The right
to a public trial, as provided for in the Federal and State Constitutions, is for
the benefit of the accused and the public merely has a privilege to attend.
JOSEPH

M. KOLMACIC

Espionage ProsecutionsIn The United States
The great dispute over the legality of the death sentence for the Rosenbergs,
convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage in violation of the 1917 Espionage
Act,1 has now entered that collection of controversies which will always be a
subject for study, particularly to legal minds, of the extreme care exercised in
American judicial processes to assure that no person, however guilty, however
heinous his crime, shall be condemned except by due process of law.
In the entire record of espionage against the United States, there has been
no case of its magnitude and drama.2 The case attracted the attention of the
150 U. S. C. §§32 (a), 34. The Act as now reads is 18 U. S. C. §§794 et seq., the
pertinent parts of which are:
(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of
the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or
transmits or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, ...
or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly, or
indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating
to the national defense, shall be imprisoned not more than twenty years.
(b) Whoever violates subsection (a) in time of war shall be punished by death or
by imprisonment for not more than thirty years.
(c) .....
(d) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of
such conspiracy.
2The literature by partisans of opposing viewpoints is voluminous, of which the
following are a few examples: America, Atomic-age Executions, July 4, 1953, p. 353;
America, The Rosenberg Case: A Cause Celebri, June 27, 1953, p. 329; Christian Century,
No Executive Clemency for the Rosenbergs, Feb. 25, 1953, p. 213; Commonweal, Regarding
the Rosenbergs, Jan. 9, 1953, p. 344; Life, The Case of the World's Greatest Secret, April 16,
1953, p. 53; Look, Red Spies in the United States, June 19, 1951, p. 31; New Republic,
The Crime and Punishment of the Rosenbergs, June 29, 1953, p. 6; Scholastic, Atom Spies:
Last Round?, Feb. 25, 1953, p. 14; Time, Mercy and Justice, Feb. 23, 1953, p. 24; The
Nation, Rosenberg Case, Nov. 8, 1952, p. 422; US News and World Report, How the Law
Protected the Rights of the Rosenbergs, June 26, 1953, p. 32.

